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Agreeing on Where to Disagree: Jain v. de Mrd and International
Arbitration Agreements
I. Introduction
In 1970, the U.S. Congress passed Chapter 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, implementing the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,' in response to the increas-
ing involvement of American businesses in international trade.2 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Jain v. de MM?
represents a novel interpretation and a broadening of Chapter 2's
reach.4
The petitioner-appellant, a citizen of India, sought to have the
court compel the respondent-appellee, a French citizen, to submit to
arbitration under an arbitration clause in a marketing agreement
between the two parties.5 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, held that it did not have
the power to compel arbitration under Chapter 2 of the FAA, because
the agreement did not specify the location of arbitration or the
method of appointing an arbitrator.' Nor could it compel arbitration
under Chapter 1, which would require the court to have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the conflict, independent of the arbitration
agreement.7
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's decision.' It interpreted the FAA to mean that the court could
compel arbitration in cases involving one or more foreign parties,
where no location for arbitration was specified, even though it did not
have subject matter jurisdiction.9
This Note will explore the facts and holding of Jain v. de Mkri in
Part II. Part III will examine the background law, and Part IV will
I Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards,June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention].
2 Jill A. Pietrowski, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration Agreements - Post-
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U.L. REv. 57, 63-64 & n.35
(1986).
3 Jain v. de M&6, 51 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995).
4 Ironically, despite the concern for American enterprise behind Chapter 2's genesis,
neither of the parties in the case were American businesses.
5 Id.
6 Jain v. de M&6, No. 94-C3388, 1994 WL 465818 (N.D. II. Aug. 23, 1994).
7 Id. at *1.
8 51 F.3d at 688.
9 Id. at 690.
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provide an analysis of the court's opinion. Finally, this Note will
conclude that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Federal
Arbitration Act is not supported by precedent and gives courts broader
power to compel arbitration than the Act's authors intended them to
have.
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts
Henri Courier de M&6, a citizen and resident of France, holds
several patents pertaining to his invention of electronic ballasts for
fluorescent and gas discharge lamps.' He entered into a contract
with Ishwar D. Jain, a citizen and resident of India, under which Jain
agreed to help de Mr6 market those inventions and negotiate licens-
es. " In return, de Mr6 would pay Jain ten percent of any amounts
he received as a result of licensing deals negotiated byJain. 2
In 1993, Jain negotiated a licensing agreement between de Mr6
and Motorola Lighting, Inc. of Illinois.'3 The agreement provided for
royalty payments from Motorola to de Mr6. 4 De Mr6 then paid
Jain $25,000, ten percent of the first advanced royalty payment from
Motorola.' Jain contended that, under his agreement with de M6re,
he was entitled to a percentage of other payments Motorola had made
to de M&6, and de M6r6 disagreed. 6
The marketing agreement provided that "any disagreement arising
out of this contract may only be presented to an arbitration commis-
sion applying French laws."' 7 It was silent as to the location of the
arbitration and the method for choosing an arbitrator.'
On March 18, 1994, Jain served de Mr6 with a demand for
arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA). 9 The AAA designated Rodolphe J.A.
de Seife as arbitrator 2' and scheduled a hearing for July 25-26,
1994.21
De Mr6 objected to the appointment of the AAA as the ar-
bitration commission and to its appointment of de Seife as arbitra-
10 Id. at 688.
" Id.
12 Id.
Is Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Jain v. de M&6, No. 94-C3388, 1994 WL 465818, at *1 (N.D. Il. Aug. 23, 1994).
21 51 F.3d at 688.
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tor." He contended that the only competent jurisdiction lay in
France, and that French law dictated that the parties' disagreement
over the appointment of an arbitrator coupled with the marketing
agreement's failure to specify a method of appointment meant. that the
arbitration clause was terminated.3 In response, Jain petitioned the
district court for an order compelling de Mr6 to submit to arbitration
and appointing Rodolphe J.A. de Seife as arbitrator. 4
B. The District Court's Opinion
The district court held that it had jurisdiction over this case under
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) .25 However, it ruled
that it did not have authority to compel arbitration under Chapter 2
of the FAA because the agreement between Jain and de Mr6 did not
specify a location for arbitration.2 ' Nor could the district court
compel arbitration under Chapter 1 of the FAA, because that would
require it to have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, which
it did not.27 The district court therefore denied Jain's petition.28
C. The Court of Appeals' Opinion
The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that, as long as it
had jurisdiction under Chapter 2, it did not need subject matter
jurisdiction in order to compel arbitration in its own district, where no
site for arbitration was named in the agreement.29 To the extent that
they do not conflict with the provisions of Chapter 2, the provisions of
Chapter 1 apply to cases that have been brought under Chapter 2 °
as this case was. Because the jurisdictional requirements of Chapter 1
conflict with Chapter 2's jurisdictional requirements, the court did not
apply them.3' But, the court did apply Chapter l's grant of authority
to compel arbitration.2
The court used the same reasoning to decide that it had authority
to appoint an arbitrator, where the method of appointing an arbitrator
was not addressed in the arbitration agreement.33 Under Chapter 2,
the court has authority to appoint an arbitrator in accordance with the
22 Id.
23 No. 94-C3388, 1994 WL 465818, at *1.
24 Id.
25 J&
26 Id. at *2.
7 Id.
28 Id. at *3.
29 Jain v. de Mr , 51 F.3d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 1995).
30 Id. at 689.
31 Id. at 691.
32 Id. at 691.
33 Id. at 692.
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provisions of the arbitration agreement s4 in cases that meet Chapter
2's jurisdictional requirements." Because the method of appointing
an arbitrator was not addressed in the agreement involved in this case,
the court looked to Chapter 1, which gives the court authority to
appoint an arbitrator.3 6 Unlike the Chapter 1 provision allowing the
court to compel arbitration in its own district, there is no requirement
of subject matter jurisdiction in the Chapter 1 provision allowing the
court to appoint an arbitrator.1
7
The court further stated that, though subject matter jurisdiction
is not necessary in order for a court to compel arbitration in its own
district, it still must have personal jurisdiction over the parties to
exercise such authority.3" The respondent in this case never asserted
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, nor did he protest service
of process, or argue forum non conveniens3 9 The court did not pass
judgment on whether such arguments by the respondent would have
been successful, except to say that the time for either arguing that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction or protesting service of process had
passed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4o
III. Background Law
A. The Federal Arbitration Act: Chapter 1"
1. Historical Background
Prior to the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), the
common law rule was that arbitration agreements were revocable and
unenforceable.42 American courts applied the English theory that
such agreements were contrary to public policy because they tended
34 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1994).
35 See id. §§ 202, 203.
36 See id. §§ 4, 5.
37 See id. § 5.
38 Jain v. de Mr, 51 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 1995); see Asahi Metal Ind. v. Superior
Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113-114 (1987) (minimum contacts are necessary for
personal jurisdiction).
39 Id.
40 Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) provides:
A defense of lack ofjurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of
process, or insufficiency ofservice of process is waived (A) if omitted from a motion
in the circumstances described in subdivision (g), or (B) if it is neither made by
motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment
thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
41 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994).
42 Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Aivards, 70 YALE LJ. 1049, 1050 (1961) (citing
United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)).
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to "oust" the courts of jurisdiction."
The U.S. Congress reversed centuries of hostility toward agree-
ments to arbitrate when it passed the FAA in 1925, declaring that such
agreements would be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.""' The FAA was designed to allow parties to avoid "the
costliness and delays of litigation," and to place arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts. " "
2. Powers and Procedure
a. The Statutory Language
Section 4 of the FAA directs the court to compel the parties to
submit to arbitration in the court's own district, pursuant to an
arbitration agreement.46 If no method for choosing an arbitrator is
specified in the agreement, section 5 directs the court to appoint an
arbitrator on its own.47
Chapter 1 applies only in a limited number of cases.48 The
43 See Pietrowski, supra note 2, at 57 n.3; Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 644-45 (3d
Cir. 1898) (agreement prior to dispute is unenforceable because it tends to oust court of
jurisdiction); Dickson Mfg. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 119 F. 488, 490 (M.D. Pa. 1902)
(agreements in advance of dispute are illegal and void).
44 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for
the revocation of any contract.
Id.
45 H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,2 (1924).
46 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). Section 4 provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such an agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in
a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the
controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in such agreement .... The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration
or failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within
the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed ....
Id.
47 Id. § 5. Section 5 provides:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming and appointing an
arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire such method shall be followed; but if no
method be provided therein ... then upon the application of either party to the
controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator ....
Id1
48 Quigley, supra note 42, at 1050.
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transaction in question must involve commerce, 49 and the court must
have jurisdiction under title 28, i.e., subject matter jurisdiction.5 0 The
FAA itself does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction." That
is, the fact that one of the parties is arguing that this federal law gives
the court the authority to compel arbitration does not mean that a
federal question has been presented.12  Therefore, a petitioner
seeking to invoke Chapter 1 must allege either that there is diversity
of citizenship and that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000,
or find some other federal question on which to base jurisdiction. 4
Two foreign parties are not considered diverse.5
b. Interpretation of the Statute
The case of Jain v. de M~ir was not the first time the Seventh
Circuit had interpreted section 4 of the FAA. In Snyder v. Smith,56 the
plaintiff was the executrix for a decedent who was one of three
partners in an investment group.57  As part of the partnership
agreement, all the partners agreed that if one partner died, the other
two would have an option to buy the deceased partner's share.58 The
agreement also specified that any disagreements regarding the
partnership agreement should be submitted to arbitration in Houston,
Texas.59 When the decedent died, the plaintiff-executrix and the
surviving partners were unable to agree on a purchase price for the
decedent's share." The plaintiff then successfully petitioned a court
in the Northern District of Illinois to order the parties to submit to
arbitration in Rockford, Illinois." The Seventh Circuit reversed,
49 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1037 (1984) (the "commerce" requirement should be construed broadly).
50 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
51 Quigley, supra note 42, at 1050.
52 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). Section 1331 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Id.
53 Id. § 1332. Section 1332 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between - (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which
citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state,
defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of
different States.
Id.
54 Id. § 1331.
55 Id. § 1332.
56 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
57 Id. at 412.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 413.
61 Id.
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finding that, although a court could compel arbitration only in its own
district under section 4,62 it could not do so if the result would
contravene a freely negotiated choice-of-forum clause.63  So, accord-
ing to the reasoning in Snyder in cases under Chapter 1 where the
arbitration agreement does specify a forum, only a district court within
that forum can compel arbitration. District courts not within that
64forum should dismiss the petition. The reasoning in Snyder hasbeen adopted in at least two other circuits.65
B. Chapter 26 The International Context
1. Historical Background
In 1970, Congress passed Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Agreement, implementing the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention),67 which was
adopted by the United Nations in 1958.68 At that time, the United
States did not sign on to the Convention because the American
delegation felt that it was in conflict with certain federal laws.69 The
United States' decision to sign the Convention in 1968 was inspired, at
least in part, by the increasing involvement of American businesses in
international trade.7° In 1925, the year Chapter 1 of the Act was
implemented, exports and imports from the United States totaled
$4.91 billion and $4.28 billion worth of merchandise, respectively.7'
By 1972, United States exports totaled $49.8 billion and imports totaled
$55.6 billion.72 In 1993, the current value of exports from the United
States was $200.5 billion, while the current value of imports was $258
billion.73
When the Convention was finally implemented, it was passed as a
separate chapter, rather than as an amendment to the already existing
provisions of Chapter 1 of the Act.74 This was done in order to "leave
unchanged the largely settled interpretation" of the Act.
75
62 Id. at 418.
63 Id. at 419.
64 Id. at 420.
65 See Roney & Co. v.Jacob Rivlin, 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1989); Nat'l Iranian Oil Co.
v. Ashland Oil Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987).
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994).
67 Convention, supra note 1.
68 H.R. REP. No. 91-1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), repinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3601.
69 Id. at 3601-2.
70 Pietrowski, supra note 2, at 57 n.l.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 H.R. REP. No. 91-1181, supra note 68, at 3603.
75 ld.
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2. Powers and Procedures
a. The Statutory Language
The jurisdictional limitations of Chapter 2 are quite different from
those of Chapter 1. Any arbitration agreement which arises out of a
commercial relationship falls under Chapter 2.76 It is excepted from
coverage under Chapter 2 if the relationship is entirely between United
States citizens, unless it involves property located in a foreign state or
requires performance abroad." There is no amount in controversy
requirement.7 8 In cases before state courts where the jurisdictional
requirements of Chapter 2 have been met, the defendant may remove
the case to federal district court.
79
Section 206 gives courts that have jurisdiction under Chapter 2 the
power to compel the parties to submit to arbitration in the place
provided for in the agreement, and to appoint an arbitrator "in
accordance with the provisions of the agreement.
80
b. Interpretation of the Statute
i. Generdl Policy
Four years after the passage of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitra-
76 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). Section 202 provides:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship...
which is considered as commercial ... falls under the Convention. An agreement
or award arising out of such relationship which is entirely between citizens of the
United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that
relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforce-
ment abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign
states.
Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. § 203. Section 203 provides:
An action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise
under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United
States (including the courts enumerated in section 460 of title 28) shall have
original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in
controversy.
Id.
79 Id. § 205. Section 205 provides:
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court
relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention, the
defendant or the defendants may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such
action or proceeding to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where the action or proceeding is pending....
Id.
80 Id. § 206. Section 206 provides:
A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held
in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for, whether that
place is within or without the United States. Such court may also appoint arbitrators
in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.
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tion Act, the U.S. Supreme Court established a policy of expansive
interpretation of the FAA in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co."' Though
Scherk was actually decided under Chapter 1 of the FAA, it involved a
foreign defendant and a domestic plaintiff, and would have met the
jurisdictional requirements of Chapter 2 as well. 2 In Scherk, the plain-
tiff, an American corporation, agreed to purchase three business
entities owned by the German defendant.83 In the purchase agree-
ment, the parties agreed that the plaintiff would receive all trademarks
associated with those enterprises.8 4  They also agreed that "any
controversy or claim" that arose out of the agreement "or the breach
thereof" would be submitted to arbitration before the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris under the laws of Illinois. 5
When the plaintiff discovered that the trademarks the defendant
had promised to convey were subject to substantial encumbrances, he
brought suit under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, contending
that the defendant had made fraudulent representations as to the
trademark rights.8 6 The defendant then moved to dismiss or, in the
alternative, to stay the action pending arbitration under Chapter 1 of
the FAA."7
The district court refused to dismiss, and held that the arbitration
clause was unenforceable under the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko
v. Swan,88 which held that "an agreement to arbitrate could not
preclude a buyer of a security from seeking ajudicial remedy," in view
of the language of the Securities Act of 1933.89 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court.90
The Supreme Court refused to interpret language in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 the same way it interpreted the language of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 in Wilko.9" Instead, it reversed the
lower court's decision and enforced the arbitration clause, noting the
growth of international trade and the passage of the Convention. The
Court held: "Our conclusion today is confirmed by international
developments and domestic legislation in the area of commercial
81 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
82 Id. at 508.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 509.
87 Id.
8 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
89 417 U.S. at 510; see 15 U.S.C. § 77(n) (1994) (barring any contract condition binding
a person acquiring a security to waive compliance with any provision of the Act).
90 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
91 Id. at 514; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C..§ 78(a) (1994). The Act
provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of
any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." Id.
1996]
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arbitration ...."12 It added that:
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying
American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify standards by which agreements to
arbitrate are observed .... 93
The presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements,
especially in the international context, was further strengthened in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.94 The respondent
in Mitsubishi Motors, a Puerto Rican corporation, agreed to sell and
distribute automobiles manufactured by the petitioner, a Japanese
corporation. 5 The parties agreed that any disputes arising out of the
agreement would be submitted to arbitration in Japan by the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association. 96 Two years into the distribution
agreement, the respondent began having problems meeting its sales
goals and attempted to arrange for "transshipments" or diversion of
the automobiles to the United States and Latin America, but the
petitioner refused. 97  Attempts by the parties to reconcile their
differences failed, and the petitioner filed suit under 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 4
and 201 to compel arbitration."
The respondent counterclaimed, asserting both an action under
the Sherman Antitrust Act and a pair of defamation claims. 99 The
district court acknowledged the doctrine set forth in American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. JR Maguire & Co., 00 that antitrust disputes are "of
a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration."'0 ' But,
relying on Scherk, it held that the international character of the
transaction "required enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate even
as to the antitrust claims."' °2 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding the district court's decision erroneous to the extent
that it had ordered the respondent's antitrust claims to arbitration.'
The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit on the grounds that,
"unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue," there should be
no exception to the federal policy of enforcing arbitration agree-
92 417 U.S. at 520-21.
93 Id. at 521 n.15.
94 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
95 Id. at 617.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 617-18.
98 Id.; see supra notes 46-55, 66-80 and accompanying text.
99 473 U.S. at 619-20.
100 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968).
101 473 U.S. at 621 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953)).
102 473 U.S. at 621.
103 723 F. 2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983).
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ments °4 Following the policy set forth in Scherk, the Court conclud-
ed that:
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require
that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.15
ii. The Four-Part Test
While Scherk and Mitsubishi Motors set a general policy for the
interpretation of the statute, Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican National
Oi 1°6 sets forth a four-part test outlining how section 206 oper-
ates. 0 7 In that case, the district court refused to order the parties to
arbitrate their dispute over who was responsible for damages resulting
from what was, at that time, the largest oil spill in world history.'°8
Sedco, an American corporation, chartered an oil tanker to Permargo,
a Mexican drilling company. Permargo contracted with Pemex, a
Mexican government-owned drilling company, to drill oil wells. 9
The agreement between Sedco and Permargo stated that Permargo
would indemnify Sedco for any damages caused as a result of
Permargo's use of the tanker."0 The agreement called for the two
companies to submit "any dispute" to arbitration in New York under
the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce."'
After a suit was filed by Sedco against Permargo and Pemex,
Permargo moved for a stay pending arbitration, but the district court
denied its motion."' The court held that the litigation between
Pemex and Sedco could not be completely resolved without Permargo
being a party also."'
Upon appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide
whether to enforce the arbitration clause in the contract between the
plaintiff-appellant Sedco and Permargo, the defendant-appellee."'
The circuit court reversed the district court and ordered the parties to
proceed with arbitration in New York,"' using a four-part test first set
forth in a 1982 case, Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno:"6
104 473 U.S. at 628.
105 Id. at 629.
106 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
107 Id. at 1144-45.
108 Id. at 1142.
109 Id. at 1143.
110 Id. at 1143-44.HII Id. at 1144.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1144-45.
116 684 F.2d 184 (lst Cir. 1982).
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1) [Is there an agreement in writing to arbitrate the dispute; in other
words, is the arbitration agreement broad or narrow; 2) does the
agreement provide for arbitration in the territory of a Convention
signatory; 3) does the agreement to arbitrate arise out of a commercial
legal relationship; 4) is a party to the agreement not an American
citizen?" 7
The court held that if the above four requirements were met, "the
Convention requires district courts to order arbitration.""1 The Fifth
Circuit also affirmed the expansive policy toward arbitration set forth
in Scherk and Mitsubishi Motors, stating that "[b]y its ratification in 1970,
the United States obligated itself to enforce arbitration agreements
between foreign and domestic contracting parties,"1 9 and that "the
Convention was passed in order to secure the right of arbitration in a
commercial context among foreign and domestic parties."'"2
iii. Sections 206, 208 and 4
While the Convention does require courts to enforce arbitration
agreements that fall under its provisions, section 206 does not require
courts to direct arbitration in the place provided for in the agree-
ment.12' It merely gives them the power to do so. 2 2 According to
the legislative history:
Section 206 permits a court to direct that arbitration be held at the place
provided for in the arbitration agreement. Since 'there may be circum-
stances in which it would be highly desirable to direct arbitration within
the district in which the action is brought and inappropriate to direct
arbitration abroad, section 206 is permissive rather than mandatory."s
Under section 208 of Chapter 2, the provisions of Chapter 1 of the
FAA apply to cases brought under Chapter 2, to the extent that those
provisions do not conflict with the provisions of Chapter 2.124 Under
117 767 F.2d at 1144-45 (quoting Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir.
1982)).
118 Id. at 1145; see Convention, supra note 1, art. II. Article II provides that:
1. Each contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen
or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed.
Convention, supra note 1, art. II.
119 767 F.2d at 1148.
120 Id. at 1149.
121 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1994).
122 Id.
123 H.R. REP. No. 91-1181, supra note 68, at 3604.
124 See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1994) ("Chapter I applies to actions and proceedings brought
under this chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the
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Chapter 1, arbitration "shall be within the district in which the petition
for an order directing such arbitration is filed."' 25 Thus, it appears
that section 206 is "permissive" in the sense that it allows courts to
compel arbitration in the place specified in the arbitration agreement.
However, section 206 also permits courts to look to section 208, which
allows courts to compel arbitration in their own district under section
4 of Chapter 1.126
Bauhinia Corp. v. China National Machine and Equipment Import and
Export Corp.127 illustrates how this works. In this Ninth Circuit case,
the appellee, a California corporation founded and headed by a
Chinese exile, had contracted to purchase nails from the appellant, a
Chinese state trading organization. 28 The contract between the
parties included a clause which called for arbitration, but was
ambiguous as to the site." When the appellant failed to deliver the
nails, claiming that an edict from the Chinese government had
prevented performance, the appellee sued. 3° The appellant moved
for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Cali-
fornia to compel arbitration before the China Council for. the
Promotion of International Trade.13" ' The district court agreed to
compel arbitration, but ordered it to be heard before the American
Arbitration Association in the Eastern District of California.,3 2 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the court's decision. 131
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, because the agreement called for
arbitration of disputes but was ambiguous with respect to where such
arbitration should take place, the court could not compel arbitration
under section 206.' Section 206, the court said, "by its terms ...
does not permit a court to designate a foreign forum when the
agreement fails to designate a place." 35 Therefore, the court looked
to section 208, which allowed it to apply section 4, under which it
could compel arbitration in the Eastern District of California, where
the court sits.
3 6
Of course, in Bauhinia, the parties were diverse, and the jurisdic-
tional requirements of section 4 were met.3 7 The only case in which
Convention as ratified by the United States").
125 Id. § 4.
126 Id.
127 819 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1986).
128 Id. at 248.
129 Id.
130 Id.
'13 Id. at 247.
132 Id. at 248.
133 Id. at 247.
134 Id. at 250.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
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a federal court has applied section 4 to a case where both parties were
foreign nationals is Oil Basins Ltd. v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd."
In Oil Basins, the defendants, two Australian corporations, agreed
to pay the plaintiff, a Bermudian corporation, royalties on hydrocar-
bons produced by one of the defendants off the coast of Australia) 9
The plaintiff's sole responsibility was to act as trustee for the royalties,
which were determined on the basis of the gross value of the hydrocar-
bons.1 40  The plaintiff brought suit, claiming that the defendants'
estimate of the gross value was too low.'4 ' The defendants removed
the case to federal court under section 205.142
The parties agreed that, under their contract, the dispute was to
be settled through arbitration.' Their only dispute was over the
location of the arbitration.'44 Though the contract did not specify
a location for arbitration and the court hearing their petition sat in the
Southern District of New York, the defendant wanted the court to
order arbitration in Australia, because it was the site "most closely
connected to the dispute, most convenient to the parties, and the
country whose law will effectively govern the dispute."'45  The
plaintiff argued that the court had no authority to compel arbitration
in Australia, absent some provision in the contract identifying Australia
as the situs for arbitration, and the court agreed.
46
The court interpreted the legislative history of section 206 to mean
that the court "may, if appropriate, direct arbitration to take place" at
the site specified in the agreement. Where no location is specified in
the agreement, the court can compel arbitration in its own district
under section .4.147 According to the court, section 4 and section 206
are only at odds where the contract specifies a location, in which case
section 206 would control. 4  The court mentioned nothing of the
sections' conflicting jurisdictional requirements, nor did it acknowl-
edge that the jurisdictional requirements of section 4 were not met in
this case. It refused to grant the defendant's request to expand the
interpretation of Chapter 2 to allow courts to compel arbitration at a
site different from the site specified in the agreement or, if no site was
specified, outside of its own district. 149  Instead, it granted the
138 613 F. Supp. 483 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
139 Id. at 485.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
14s Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 486.
14 Id.
147 Id. at 487.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 488.
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plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration in its own district under
sections 4 and 206.150
iv. The Method for Appointing an Arbitrator
The operation of the statute where no method for choosing an
arbitrator is specified in the arbitration agreement is illustrated by Euro-
Mec Import, Inc. v. Pantrem & C., S.p.A. 5' In that case, the plaintiff,
a Pennsylvania corporation, and the defendant, an Italian corporation,
entered into an agreement under which the plaintiff would become
the sole distributor of the defendant's goods in the United States,
Puerto Rico and Jamaica. 5 The agreement also specified that
disputes should be arbitrated in Geneva, but did not specify a method
for choosing an arbitrator.'
The defendant terminated its relationship with the plaintiff,
claiming that the plaintiff had failed to pay for delivered goods.'54
In response, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging breach of contract. 15
The defendant then moved for the court to compel arbitration."'
The plaintiff claimed that the arbitration clause was unenforceable
because it lacked "specificity regarding the method of choosing
arbitrators, the governing arbitration association, and the governing
laws for arbitration."'
57
The court first determined that the case did fall under Chapter 2,
using the four-part test set forth in Ledee."' Though Chapter 2's
section 206 would allow the court to "appoint arbitrators in accordance
with the provisions of the agreement,"5 9 that section was inapplicable
in this case because there was no such provision in the agreement
between the parties."' Thus, the court looked to section 208, which
allows a court to apply Chapter 1 "to international agreements to the
extent that it does not conflict with Chapter 2."16 Citing Chapter
1, section 5, which allows the court to "designate and appoint an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, "162 the court held that section 5
150 Id. On the defendant's motion to reopen, the court eventually dismissed the case
on grounds of forum non conveniens. Id.
151 No. 92-2624, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18046 (N.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1992).
152 Id. at *I.
153 Id. at *1-2.
154 Id. at *2.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at "3.
158 Id. at *8-9 (citing Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F. Supp. 1314, 1321-22 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990) (citing Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186 (Ist Cir. 1982))).
159 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1994).
160 No. 92-2624, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18046 at *7.
161 Id. at *8.
162 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
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saved the arbitration clause from being held unenforceable for lack of
specificity. 6  Unlike Chapter l's section 4, section 5 does not
require that the court have jurisdiction under title 28."6
IV. Significance of the Case
A. The Case Law
The Seventh Circuit's decision is not directly supported by any
case law, save the decision made by the district court for the Southern
District of New York in Oil Basins, which the Seventh Circuit itself
distinguished from the case at hand.'6 In that case, the district
court seemed to be presenting a novel interpretation of the law
without even knowing it. That is, it simply assumed that it did not need
title 28 jurisdiction in order to compel jurisdiction in its own district,
without even discussing or acknowledging that a court had never
exercised this power before.'66 The plaintiff, the defendant and the
district court appeared to assume that the court could compel
arbitration in New York under section 4, even though it did not have
title 28 jurisdiction.'67 The only question the district court was trying
to answer was whether it could compel arbitration elsewhere.' 6  The
court in Jain did -not take it as given that it did not need title 28
jurisdiction to compel arbitration under section 4, but it came out with
the same result as the Oil Basins court. 69
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit's decision actually appears to
conflict with the First Circuit's decision in Ledee"7° and the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Sedco.' The second criteria of the four-part test
first set forth in Ledee and repeated in Sedco asks: "does the agreement
provide for arbitration in the territory of a Convention signatory?"'72
Clearly, the arbitration clause that the Seventh Circuit in Jain had to
163 No. 92-2624, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18046 at *13.
164 9 U.S.C. §§ 4-5 (1994).
165 SeeJain v. de M&6, 51 F.3d 686, 691 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit argued:
Oil Basins does present a scenario almost identical to the instant case. Yet in Oil
Basins, . . . the defendants sought an expansive reading of § 206 rather than a
restrictive reading of § 4. Both parties in Oil Basins wanted the court to compel
arbitration, and it was only a matter of where that arbitration should occur. Oil
Basins, therefore, did not directly address the issue de Mrn raises.
Id.
166 1&
167 See Oil Basins Ltd. v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 483, 485
(D.C.N.Y. 1985).
168 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
169 51 F.3d at 691.
170 Jain v. de Mr6, 684 F.2d 184, 185-86 (lst Cir. 1982); see supra notes 116-17 and
accompanying text.
171 Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos Nat'l Oil, 767 F.2d 1140,1144 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra
notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
172 767 F.2d at 1145; see supra text accompanying note 117.
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contemplate did not 173 so it fails the four-part test to be used by
courts in deciding whether to enforce an arbitration clause..174
Furthermore, the court in Sedco wrote of the United States' duty under
the Convention to enforce arbitration clauses between foreign and
domestic parties, not two foreign parties.' 7' A case between a foreign
and domestic party, as long as the amount in controversy topped
$50,000, would meet the jurisdictional requirements of section 4.176
Of course, it could be said that the Seventh Circuit is merely
acting consistently with the strong policy for enforcing arbitration
agreements set forth by the Supreme Court in Scherk17' and Mitsubishi
Motors.178 In Scherk, the Supreme Court refused to interpret a federal
statute in the same manner as it had interpreted a nearly identical
statute in the past, in order to avoid the result of rendering arbitration
clauses unenforceable in cases involving securities claims.179 In
Mitsubishi, the Court reversed decades-old case law in order to avoid
rendering arbitration clauses in antitrust cases unenforceable. 0 In
both cases, the Court cited the language of the Convention, which
states that: "Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all
or any differences which have arisen .... .""' The Convention
includes no exceptions for certain categories of conflicts.'
It could be said that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Jain is
consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in the sense that the
court interpreted the federal statute to avoid the result of excluding
from enforcement under the Convention a certain category of cases -
those between two foreign parties where no site for arbitration is speci-
fied.
But Jain could also be distinguished from the Supreme Court
precedent on two grounds. First, if the court in Jain had declined to
compel arbitration in its district, it would not necessarily have meant
that the clause was unenforceable, as it would have if the Supreme
173 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
174 See 51 F.3d at 691.
175 See 767 F.2d at 1148 ("By its ratification in 1970, the United States obligated itself to
enforce arbitration agreements between foreign and domestic contracting parties"); Id. at
1149 ("The Convention was passed in order to secure the right of arbitration in a commercial
context among foreign and domestic parties"); supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
176 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
177 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see supra notes 81-93 and
accompanying text.
178 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); see
supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
179 417 U.S. at 515-17; see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
180 473 U.S. at 629; see supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
181 Convention, supra note 1, art. II, pt. 1 (emphasis added); 417 U.S. a: 520; 473 U.S.
629; see supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
182 Convention, supra note 1, art. II, pt. 1
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Court had gone the other way in Scherk and Mitsubishi. It merely would
have meant that the plaintiff would have had to go to another tribunal
to try to get the arbitration clause enforced. Second, the Supreme
Court's decisions in Scherk and Mitsubishi could be interpreted as
establishing a policy of enforcing an arbitration clause regardless of the
nature of the underlying dispute."' But in Jain, the nature of the
underlying dispute was not the reason that the district court refused to
compel arbitration. 8 4 It seems that, in Jain, the Seventh Circuit was
trying to establish a policy of enforcing an arbitration clause regardless
of whether the arbitration clause specified a location for arbitration or
whether it even had jurisdiction under section 4.185
B. The Federalization of Arbitration Suits
The respondent-appellee injain argued that the Seventh Circuit's
decision to compel arbitration in its own district, despite its lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, would lead to the federalization of
arbitration suits.'86 The jurisdictional limitations of section 4 protect
against the federalization of domestic arbitration claims, but, in Jain,
the Seventh Circuit bent, and even ignored, those limits. 8 7 However,
Congress already has established that international arbitration cases are
the appropriate domain of federal courts by passing Chapter 2.188
Under the jurisdictional requirements of Chapter 2, the Jain case was
properly in federal court, and the parties' failure to specify a site for
arbitration does not change that.8 9
The Jain decision does nothing to change the court's jurisdiction
over purely domestic arbitration cases. Domestic cases must qualify
under title 28 to be heard in federal court, and international cases
must qualify under section 202 to be heard in federal court, regardless
of whether the arbitration clause in question specifies a site for
arbitration.
If the respondent-appellee's argument were accepted, a state court
might have the power to compel arbitration where a federal court
could not. For example, two Illinois statutes grant courts the authority
to enforce arbitration agreements.' 90 But, under section 205 of the
183 While Scherk involved a securities claim, Mitsubishi Motors involved an antitrust claim.
See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
186 Jain v. de M&6, 51 F.3d. at 691.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 SeeJain v. de M&6, No. 94-C3388, 1994 WL 465818 (holding that the court does have
jurisdiction, but does not have authority to compel arbitration).
190 See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 10, 101 (1993). Paragraph 101 provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision
in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising
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FAA, in a case between two foreign entities that meets the require-
ments of section 202, a party could remove the case from Illinois state
court to federal court.'9' Then, that same party could move to
dismiss the case from federal court because there is no site specified
for arbitration, making the court powerless to compel arbitration
under section 206.192 Also, since the court does not have title 28
jurisdiction, it would be powerless to compel arbitration under section
4.193
C. Foreign Nationals in American Courts
The respondent-appellee also argued that the Seventh Circuit's
decision could have the effect of drawing disputes between two foreign
entities into U.S. courts. 9 4 It is possible to envision a scenario where
two foreign parties sign a commercial contract with an arbitration
clause that does not specify a site for arbitration. One party could
petition a federal court to compel arbitration in its own district.
Under the ruling in Jain v. de Mr, a federal court could do so, even
if the contract had no relation to the United States whatsoever.9 5
To a certain extent, the personal jurisdiction requirement protects
against a "vast migration" to the United States of international
arbitration suits that bear no relation to the United States. Even
though, under Jain v. de MKr, a court does not have to have subject
matter jurisdiction in order to compel arbitration in its own district, it
still must have personal jurisdiction over the parties.' So, although
a court could conceivably force two foreign parties to submit to
arbitration in the United States, it first would have to be established
that they had minimum contacts with that district.'97 In addition,
even if the court does have personal jurisdiction over the parties, a
forum non conveniens argument is still open for either foreign party to
between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as
exist for the revocation of any contract ....
Ild.; see id. 1 102. Paragraph 102 provides:
On application of a party showing an agreement described in Section 1, and the
opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed
with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to
arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so
raised and shall order arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the
application shall be denied.ld.
191 Jain v. de M&6, 51 F.3d at 691.
192 Id.; see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
193 51 F.3d at 691; see supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
194 51 F.3d at 691.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 SeeAsahi Metal Ind. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987).
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make as grounds for dismissal.',.
The court limited the scope of its decision to the facts of this case:
one foreign party can compel another foreign party to submit to
arbitration in a federal district in the United States, but only if their
arbitration agreement does not specify a location for arbitration and
the parties have minimum contacts in that district."'
V. Conclusion
Under the Seventh Circuit's decision, a foreign entity could be
forced to submit to arbitration in any district in the United States in
which it has minimum contacts, if it enters into a contract with another
foreign entity that has an arbitration clause that fails to specify a site
for arbitration.2l °  The court remarked that if a foreign party wants
to avoid this result and ensure that it can control where it has to
arbitrate, it should specify a site in the agreement.20
The Convention was adopted in order to promote stability and
consistency in international commercial dealings. 2 2  It could be
argued that the ruling in Jain does nothing to further that cause in
that a foreign party, once it signs an arbitration clause that does not
specify a site, could be subjected to arbitration in any of a multitude
of districts where it has merely minimum contacts.
If the Seventh Circuit had declined to compel arbitration in its
own district, that would not necessarily have contravened the Conven-
tion's mandate that all arbitration clauses be enforced. It simply would
have meant that the parties would have had to go to some other
jurisdiction, such as a French court, to have their arbitration clause
enforced.
The Mitsubishi Motors Court wrote that: "Unless Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue," there should be no exception to the federal
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.21° In this case, Congress
has clearly "evinced its intentions" in section 4 - a court can compel
arbitration in its own district, but only if it has title 28 jurisdiction.2 °4
198 In fact, the court of appeals appears to be inviting such an argument from the
respondent-appellee in the last paragraph of its decision, reminding de Mr6 that: "the
defendant may still invoke forum non conveniens arguments." 51 F.3d at 692; see supra note 39
and accompanying text.
199 51 F.3d at 692; see supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
200 51 F.3d at 692.
201 Id.
202 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n. 15 (1974).
203 Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1st Cir. 1985); see
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
204 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
[VOL;'21'
1996] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 441
Because title 28 jurisdiction was lacking in Jain v. de Mr, the Seventh
Circuit appears to have contradicted that intention.
JENNIFER L. PILLA

